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I. Introduction 
Worker centers, community-based organizations that serve the most marginalized and 
unrepresented workers in American society, are under attack, again. With the decline of 
traditional labor unions in recent decades, worker centers have emerged to fill the void left by 
this decline and to organize and amplify the collective voice of low-wage, largely immigrant 
workers. These worker centers seek to rebalance the relative collective bargaining power 
between labor and capital in the 21st century economy. Technological advances, globalization, 
and the continued growth of the service sector have led to socioeconomic changes that have little 
resemblance to the industrial society that existed at the time the labor laws were initially adopted. 
In this new work environment, workers toil at poverty wages and in deplorable working 
conditions. As employers reconstruct their businesses to reduce payroll costs, workers have been 
isolated and left relatively powerless to voice their concerns and assert their rights. It is in this 
context that the worker centers have begun to organize the new working class and to push for 
local and national enforcement of their rights.  
Currently unencumbered by the requirements and limitations under the national labor law 
regime, worker centers have been able to deploy tactics that have been denied to traditional labor 
unions. Primarily, worker centers are not subject to the prohibition against secondary boycotts 
under the NLRA. As such, worker centers have not been stymied by the changing nature of the 
employment landscape and decentralized business model. Worker centers have been successful 
in applying economic pressure on business entities that, while not in a direct labor dispute with 
workers, have significant influence over working conditions. This success has angered business 
groups, who have continually called for the NLRB and the Department of Labor to determine 
that worker centers are statutory labor organizations that must abide by the same rules as labor 
unions. While initial decisions by these agencies suggest that they will not be held to be labor 
organizations under the law, the change in administrative tides may bring a drastic change to the 
agencies’ interpretations of the labor law provisions and case law precedent.  
In this paper, I will present an overview of the current “labor organization” question 
being asked by pro-business groups and offer a textual and policy-based argument for why 
worker centers should not be held to be statutory labor organizations and required to comply 
with the stringent labor law provisions. In enacting the Wagner Act in 1935, Congress 
announced the national labor policy: to ensure labor peace through the balancing of bargaining 
power between capital and labor, which requires that the rights of labor to organize and to select 
a collective bargaining representative be recognized and enforced. While much has changed 
since 1935, this is still the stated labor policy of the United States. The service, organizing, and 
advocacy conducted by worker centers on behalf of low-wage, immigrant workers furthers this 
policy in contemporary times. These organizations utilize the principles and protections inherent 
in the labor laws to improve the bargaining position of low-wage workers and to hold employers 
accountable for violations of the labor law protections. Requiring worker centers to comply with 
the law’s restrictions on tactics and reporting and disclosure requirements would inhibit the 
flexibility and experimentation that has been key to the success of these groups in countering 
capital’s powerful bargaining position. Applying the current labor law regime to worker centers 
would not only be inapposite to the terms of the statute, it would be in contravention of the stated 
national policy underlying these laws.  
Part II will discuss the rise of worker centers to provide a collective voice to marginalized 
workers and outline the typical worker center model. Part III will give an overview of American 
labor law, which is crucial to understanding why the requirements and prohibitions embedded in 
the current form of the National Labor Relations Act would be inappropriate if applied to worker 
centers. Part IV will discuss weaknesses under the current labor law regime, including 
protections that were not included in the original statutes, the shortcomings NLRA in remedying 
violations committed by employers, and weaknesses stemming from changes in the socio-
economic context to which the law has been unable to adapt. Part V provides an overview of 
business groups’ response to the worker center movement and the relevance of this response in 
the dawn of Trump. In Part VI, I provide an analysis of the “labor organization” question and 
offer textual, policy, and constitutional arguments as to why worker centers do not and should 
not be considered statutory labor organizations and held to the same restrictive standards as 
traditional labor unions.  
II. Worker Centers: A New Species of Concerted Activity    
A. The Restaurant Opportunities Center rises from the ashes of tragedy to advocate 
on behalf of low-wage restaurant workers  
The Restaurant Opportunities Center (ROC) serves as a prime example of and helpful 
model to better understand this new species of labor organization as pro-business groups 
frequently target ROC in their campaigns to have worker centers fall under the provisions of 
current labor laws.1 ROC was originally started as a project of the Hotel Employees and 
Restaurant Employees (HERE) local union chapter in New York City in order to further support 
the surviving former workers of the Windows on the World restaurant in the World Trade Center 
who lost their jobs after the September 11th terrorist attack.2 In 2003, ROC, under the leadership 
of Saru Jayaraman, established itself as an independent organization to represent low-wage, 
largely “back of the house” restaurant workers.3 The tragedy of September 11th helped to bring 
the working conditions of the restaurant industry to national attention and served as a rallying 
point for ROC to engage industry members and the general public to demand better enforcement 
of labor and employment laws as well as more protective legislation.4  
 The initial mission of ROC was to assist former employees of the Windows on the World 
in looking for new jobs and obtaining relief support.5 However, an opportunity to establish itself 
as the voice of the restaurant worker soon arose when the owner of the Windows on the World 
opened a new restaurant and refused to hire his former employees.6 After organizing a protest 
                                               
1 Thomas I.M. Gottheil, No Part of the Bargain: Worker Centers and Labor Law in Sociohistorical Context, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2228, 2261 (2014) 
2 Id.; Saru Jayaraman, From Triangle Shirtwaist to Windows on the World: Restaurants as the New Sweatshops, 14 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 625, 640 (2011).  
3 Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2261. 
4 See Jayaraman, supra note 2 at 639 (explaining that most of the Windows employees who perished on September 
11th were low-wage immigrant workers. As the government-funded Victim Compensation Fund distributed money 
to families based on victim’s income and age, the deaths of these workers left their families with very little in terms 
of compensation). The Windows employees “had worked at the highest grossing restaurant in the United States, but 
had earned between $200 and $300 weekly….” Id.  
5 Id. at 640.  
6 Id.  
outside of the new restaurant that received a lot of publicity, the owner agreed to hire the 
Windows workers.7 In response to this success, restaurant workers began to flock to ROC to help 
them address violations in their workplaces.8 Since then, ROC has grown into a national worker 
center with local affiliates in 8 states as of 2011.9  
 Today, ROC conducts participatory research and organizes restaurant workers to lobby 
local and national legislatures to adopt more protective legislation on issues including minimum 
wage and paid sick leave.10 Choosing to target upscale, fine dining establishments to enhance the 
public interest of their campaigns, ROC conducts “high profile campaigns against exploitation in 
fine dining restaurant companies”.11 A large part of what ROC does centers on litigation against 
violating employers for wage theft, discrimination, dangerous work conditions, and other 
violations of the employment and labor laws.12 Litigation is usually supplemented with public 
demonstrations, which usually result in employers settling disputes out of court by agreeing to 
reinstatement, back wages, and the promise “to take affirmative steps to ensure compliance with 
the law in the future.”13 ROC attempts to involve its members in every step of the litigation to 
further member leadership and active participation.14 Additionally, ROC provides leadership 
development programs and works to promote the “high road” to profitability by partnering with 
“responsible” employers.15 Membership within ROC is treated as a privilege, conditioning help 
with an employment issue with a requirement to attend educational classes on employment, 
health, and safety rights.16  
 The stated mission of ROC is “to improve wages and working conditions for the nation’s 
restaurant workforce.17  Citing the size and strength of the National Restaurant Association, ROC 
founder Saru Jayaraman describes restaurant workers’ weak bargaining position and vulnerable 
social and economic position as the genesis of ROC’s independent identity.18 Restaurant 
workers, who tended to be low-wage immigrant workers, “faced conditions of poverty wages, 
shaved hours, lack of lunch breaks, health and safety hazards, discrimination and more”.19 
Through its flexible strategies, member-oriented practices, and emphasis on industry 
cooperation, ROC serves as a “powerful national vehicle for restaurant workers to lift their 
                                               
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 641. 
9 Id. 
10 See id. at 640; Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2261.  
11 Jayaraman, supra note 2 at 641.  
12 See Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2261-62.  
13 Id. at 2262.  
14 Id.  
15 Jayaraman, supra note 2 at 641. See also RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER UNITED, http://rocunited.org/our-
work/#promoting-the-high-road (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) (“Engaging employers through our “high road” employer 
association RAISE, which provides: training, technical assistance, and a peer network of like-minded employers 
following the high road to profitability, which includes higher wages and working conditions for those employed at 
their restaurants; leadership development and civic engagement opportunities; research and communications work 
that documents the benefits for all three stakeholders of taking the high road and more.”).  
16 Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2262.  
17 RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER UNITED, http://rocunited.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).   
18 Jayaraman, supra note 2 at 636.  
19 Id.  
collective voice”20 to bring labor and employment law noncompliance to national attention and 
force State involvement in “labour standards enforcement”.21   
B. Community organizations respond to the needs of low wage workers   
Without exception, the literature on worker centers is based on the findings of a survey22 
conducted by Janice Fine with the support of the Neighborhood Funders Group and the 
Economic Policy Institute published in 2006. The survey offers an in-depth analysis of the 
history and common features of worker centers, enabling academics and other interested parties 
to define this relatively recent phenomena. While this study remains incredibly useful today, it 
would be appropriate for a follow up study in the near future to document any changes in the 
composition, overall mission, and organizing strategies of these groups. As the question of 
whether an entity is a labor organization under the NLRA or LMRDA has been a fact intensive 
inquiry, it will be important to have up-to-date information on both the explicit purpose of 
worker centers and the activities undertaken by these groups. With this caveat, I have 
summarized some of the key findings of the 2006 study below that are most relevant to this 
paper. 
“Worker centers are community-based mediating institutions that provide support to low 
wage workers.”23 Worker centers generally have non-profit tax exempt status and largely run on 
the financial support of charitable foundations.24 As reported, there were 137 worker centers as 
of 2005, and 122 of the worker centers primarily served immigrant workers.25 While these 
worker centers may have their roots in different types of social and civil organizations, Janice 
Fine found that worker centers in general have a common origin story. In the most general sense, 
worker centers have emerged to fill the void in the “decline of institutions that historically 
provided workers with a vehicle for collection action”, and immigrant work centers in particular 
have emerged in response to the influx of immigrant workers and the absence of social 
institutions to serve the needs of this group.26 Worker centers started out as NGOs, social service 
organizations, churches, legal aid societies, and university organizations, and have transformed 
into the complex and dynamic institutions that they are today due to a “common desire for a 
local organization that would provide services, conduct advocacy, and encourage organizing on 
the part of low-wage workers in the absence of anything else.”27  
Janice Fine describes the common origin story of a majority of worker centers as starting 
with a “catalyzing event” that sent workers in search of a support organization:  
“These workers and the allies they find to help them then try to figure out how to 
address the immediate situation but often discover that the particular issue they 
have confronted is emblematic of a much larger problem, and one that no existing 
                                               
20 Id. at 640. 
21 See Janice Fine, New Forms to Settle Old Scores: Updating the Worker Centre Story in the United States, 66 
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 604, 614 (2011) (discussing the work of worker centers in general in publicizing 
employer violations of current labor law standards and advocating for better government enforcement).  
22 JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF A DREAM (2006).  
23 Id. at 2.  
24 See Fine, supra note 21 at 606; Jarol B. Manheim, THE EMERGING ROLE OF WORKER CENTERS IN UNION 
ORGANIZING: AN UPDATE AND SUPPLEMENT, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 57 (2017) (finding that worker centers 
depend almost entirely on donations from “progressive activist foundations” while traditional labor organizations 
have “kept at arm’s length” from these new organizations).  
25 Id. at 3.  
26 Id. at 14.  
27 Id. at 14-15.  
organization is addressing. In this way, a host of ethnic NGOs, churches, legal aid 
centers, social service agencies, and university communities have almost literally 
‘backed into’ organizing and advocating for low-wage workers. They did so upon 
discovering that a service approach was simply not enough and that there was a 
void in terms of institutions for collective action among low-wage workers. As 
widely as these institutions differ from one another in form and function, most 
seem to have settled on the worker center model when their existing programs and 
strategies proved inadequate.”28  
This origin story shared by many worker centers reflects a history of flexibility, adaptation, and 
ability to recognize and accommodate unmet needs of low wage workers. As will be discussed 
below, the activities and strategies carefully selected by worker centers allows for this flexibility 
that allows worker centers to service a new class of workers that traditional unions have been 
unable to organize.   
C. Worker centers: A national survey 
By offering a combination of services, advocacy projects, and organizing opportunities, 
worker centers distinguish themselves from other community centers and social service groups.29 
Worker centers have become an important feature in immigrant communities, serving as 
“gateway organizations that are meeting immigrant workers where they are and providing them 
with a wealth of information and training.”30 Worker centers may take various approaches to 
their work depending on the needs of the workers in the communities they serve31, but, as Janice 
Fine discovered in her study, worker centers engage in a lot of the same activities and have a lot 
of features in common.32 First, most worker centers offer individualized legal services to workers 
in helping them to file claims against their employer with government agencies.33 Worker centers 
provide education services to community members, including “know your rights” information 
materials and support in various languages34, ESL instruction, advocacy and organizing training, 
and leadership development. These institutions lead both policy campaigns and direct economic 
campaigns directed at government officials and industry members.35 Many worker centers 
                                               
28 Id. at 15.  
29 Id. at 2 (defining the service, advocacy, and organizing work of worker centers as: “Service delivery: providing 
legal representation to recover unpaid wages; English classes; worker rights education; access to health clinics, bank 
accounts, and loans. Advocacy: researching and releasing exposés about conditions in low-wage industries, lobbying 
for new laws and changes in existing ones, working with government agencies to improve monitoring and grievance 
processes, and bringing suits against employers. Organizing: building ongoing organizations and engaging in 
leadership development among workers to take action on their own for economic and political change.”  
30 Id. at 5.  
31 Id. at 20 (explaining that 56% of the worker centers surveyed performed industry-specific organizing where they 
assisted workers in the creation of organizations focused on improving wages and working conditions within a 
specific industry in a particular geographic area; 44% of centers surveyed did not engage in industry-specific 
organizing and instead worked with workers across industries in a particular geographic area to address non-industry 
specific issues).  
32 Id. at 12.  
33 Id. at 78 (explaining the process by which worker centers seek to assist individuals with their grievances against 
their employers, which begins with the worker centers reaching out directly with the employer to discuss the claim. 
If this proves unsuccessful, the legal staff members at worker centers will help workers fill out complaint forms, 
gather the necessary documentation to support their claim, and file the complaint with state and federal agencies).   
34 Id. at 75, 77.  
35 See infra notes 98-106.  
engage in direct economic action against individual employers on behalf of workers36, and they 
may organize industry level or sectoral direct economic action campaigns if appropriate.  Most 
worker centers also serve an important function as immigrant rights advocates in their 
communities as well as on a broader social level.37  
 Second, while worker centers vary in their program offerings and strategic decision-
making, most share some common features in addition to offering a combination of service, 
advocacy, and organizing efforts38: 
• “Place-based rather than work-site based:” Unlike traditional labor unions, worker 
centers are not worksite-based and do not focus their activities toward any particular 
employer or workplace. Worker centers do not seek to be the exclusive collective 
bargaining representative of any group of workers, and therefore do not seek to establish 
majority support within any individual employer.  
• “Strong ethnic and racial identification:” While some worker centers seek to assist 
workers within a particular industry, many worker centers organize along ethnic or racial 
lines. These worker centers understand that issues of race and ethnicity intersect with 
economic and social issues in important ways and seek to address this. 
• “Leadership development and internal democracy:” Most worker centers make worker 
participation a central feature of their organization, and they strive to involve members in 
all decision making. To accomplish this, many centers provide leadership development 
programs that train workers on how to meaningfully participate in the activities of the 
center.   
• “A broad agenda:” While employment issues are the primary focus of many worker 
centers, these institutions have taken a broader approach to serving their communities and 
often respond to the various social, political, health, legal, education, and housing issues 
of their members.  
• “Coalition building:” Worker centers have joined both formal and informal alliances with 
other community organizations, government agencies, and traditional unions.  
• “Small and involved memberships:” Most worker centers “view membership as a 
privilege that is not automatic but must be earned” and require workers to complete 
classes or workshops on worker rights in order to become a member.  
 
 In general, worker centers face a difficult dilemma with respect to the services they 
decide to provide to community members. There is a concern among contemporary community 
organizations that “doing for others” is inefficient as it diverts attention and resources away from 
achieving the long-term benefits of “teaching them to do for themselves.”39 Worker centers have 
made a conscious choice to focus on long-term change and social transformation, which is 
dependent on social justice reform and improved economic policies.40 The goal of worker centers 
is to promote collective action approaches to change by showing workers that “the solution to 
their situation requires collective action to alter the relations of power and win concrete 
                                               
36 Id. at 81 (often times, worker centers will supplement or substitute for litigation against an employer by 
organizing pickets or boycotts of violating employers involving the workers of the employer as well as other 
supporters. Worker centers often use these direct action campaigns to garner media attention).  
37 Id. at 12.  
38 Id. at 13-14.  
39 Id. at 72.  
40 Id. 
victories.”41 However, worker centers also realize that workers, particularly immigrant workers, 
are struggling now and the promise of far-off change does little to alleviate the poor working 
conditions and oppressive employment situations these workers find themselves in.42 Without the 
worker centers, many of these workers would not have access to legal redress for their 
employment issues. Additionally, the provision of services helps to attract new workers to the 
worker center and establishes the legitimacy of the worker centers within the low wage, 
immigrant worker community.43 Lastly, the legal services offered by worker centers enable these 
organizations to collect data and cultivate compelling worker narratives that will be used in the 
centers’ advocacy campaigns to win the sympathy of government officials and the general 
public.44    
 The organizing activities of worker centers can be described as falling into one of two 
categories, although campaigns often fall into both categories: “economic action organizing” and 
“public policy organizing”.45 In their economic action organizing, worker centers have sought to 
address head on the obstacles subcontracting and decentralized production schemes pose to 
organizing and work to “unpack the production chain in order to identify the real powers-that-be 
in an industry and force them to take responsibility for their subcontractors’ behavior.”46 
Through lawsuits, local pickets and protests, national boycott campaigns, and carefully crafted 
settlement agreements, worker centers have successfully “extend[ed] culpability up the 
production chain from subcontractors to manufacturers and retailers.”47 To further help breach 
the “structural mismatch between the approach to union organizing specified by the Act and the 
approach that makes sense for workers in the low wage economy”48, worker centers partner with 
government agencies to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms of existing laws and to advocate 
for new industry or sectoral level regulation and policy changes.49 
 In addition to public policy organizing in pursuit of improved enforcement of current 
labor protections and of policy changes to address issues that are not properly addressed under 
existing labor law, worker centers engage in other forms of public policy organizing at the local 
and national level to address issues that can be broadly categorized as social justice reform50, 
                                               
41 Id. at 73.  
42 Id. at 72. 
43 Id. (“It is in the context of their dual oppression as workers and immigrants, the long-term nature of solutions, and 
pressing short term needs that the majority of worker centers have come around to the necessity of service 
delivery.”).  
44 Id. at 79.  
45 Id. at 101.  
46 Id. at 102-03.  
47 Id. at 103-04 (using the campaign the Garment Worker Center waged against the Forever 21 label in the early 
2000s as an example of the tactics used by worker centers to put economic pressure on business entities in positions 
of power and control over the terms and conditions of the workers in the bottom-most level of the production chain).  
48 Id. at 161 (“The NLRA…was designed with large, stable employers and worksites in mind, which unions, it was 
presumed, would organize and bargain with on a single-employer basis. But many low-wage workers have small 
and diffuse worksites, and they are employed by businesses in highly competitive industries who very often cannot 
act on their own to raise wages and improve working conditions because they would be at a severe competitive 
disadvantage. In these situations, low-wage workers need multi-employer bargaining on a geographic/industrial, or 
chain-of-production/business network basis.”).    
49 Id. at 162, 171.  
50 Id. at 191 ([M]any worker centers do not focus exclusively on labor and employment issues—or immigration 
issues. Their broad ‘social justice’ agendas mandate that they also organize around racism and domestic violence, 
education and youth, housing and development, and health care issues.”) 
with immigration reform being a primary topic.51 To worker centers, workers’ fight against 
discrimination, xenophobia, and racism are just as important and in need of collective action-
based strategies as their wage and conditions of work-based issues.52 Worker centers actively 
participate in local and national immigrant rights coalitions through protests and rallies, activities 
that resemble those conducted in economic action organizing.53 
 On a final note regarding the common features of worker centers, the internal structure of 
worker centers may vary depending on the goals of the organization and the financial resources 
available but are similar in that the internal governance and organization style is flexible and 
highly influenced by centers’ long-term orientation. As worker centers tend to focus on future 
economic and social transformation, they subsequently devote a lot of time and energy on 
cultivating the internal life of their group and on developing the leadership potential of their 
members.54 Worker centers strive to establish and maintain internal democracy, encouraging 
high levels of participation in center programming and decision making.55 Unlike traditional 
labor unions, membership in worker centers is not based on dues56 or of signing representation 
cards. Rather, membership is a privilege to be earned through participation and becoming 
educated in the realm of workers’ rights.57 
D. Relationship between worker centers and traditional labor unions   
Worker centers have varying relationships with traditional labor unions, where some 
worker centers work independently of unions and some centers work in collaboration with 
unions on industry or sector based organizing drives.58 Across these diverse relationships, the 
underlying reality is that worker centers and traditional unions are different. Culture differences 
exist between these two types of groups, with worker centers viewing labor unions as being 
undemocratic, top-down, and unresponsive to the needs of community members.59 Unions view 
worker centers as “undisciplined and unrealistic about what it takes to win.”60 Where unions 
have an established process for governing their organization and for structuring negotiations with 
employers, worker centers remain flexible in their approach to organizing, experimenting with 
new tactics based on the needs of its members.61 With these core differences, many worker 
centers and unions were initially hostile toward each other and were “explicitly rejectionist” of 
the activities of the other.62  
                                               
51 Id. at 180 (“Many worker centers view their work as much through a social justice frame—championing the rights 
of immigrants and people of color generally—as they do through a workers’ rights frame.”). 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 188.  
54 Id. at 201.  
55 Id. at 202-03.  
56 At the time the survey was conducted, dues were not seen by the majority of worker centers as being a central part 
of their overall budget. Id. at 221. The study revealed several reasons for why worker centers were not collecting or 
relying on dues to support their activities, ranging from moral opposition to the concept of paying for membership to 
a lack of internal structure to collect and process dues. Id. at 221-22. Rather, worker centers rely primarily on 
charitable donations from large foundations. Id. at 218.   
57 Id. at 210.  
58 Id. at 120. 
59 Id. at 124.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Janice Fine, New Forms to Settle Old Scores: Updating the Worker Centre Story in the United States, 66 
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 604, 617 (2011).  
However, the more recent trend has been toward a symbiotic relationship between unions 
and worker centers in the form of partnerships and collaborations.63 Due to their greater 
resources and experiences in organizing workers, unions offer guidance, infrastructure support, 
and financial support to worker centers.64 Worker centers in turn will often help workers connect 
with local unions in the community to address their individual service needs, as worker centers 
have had more success than unions in organizing the low-wage, immigrant communities.65 In a 
later article written to update and supplement her initial 2006 study, Janice Fine indicated a 
growing trend toward federation whereby “strong individual centres have joined existing 
national networks or formed new ones which have, in turn, helped to establish new organizations 
or affiliate existing ones.”66 Worker centers have utilized their expanding networks to leverage 
collective power in campaigning for “global worker justice, immigrant rights, the rights to 
organize for workers historically excluded from collective bargaining rights and the right to 
decent work and living conditions in America’s cities.”67  
Janice Fine has commented that the success of worker centers in “the largely non-union 
service economy, low-end construction, meatpacking, light manufacturing…and in industries 
and among constituencies unions had given up long ago as too difficult to organize” is due in 
large part to the fact that worker centers are not constrained by the current labor law scheme.68 
Unlike traditional unions, worker centers have not been “stripped… of some of their most potent 
tactics”.69 As such, worker centers are able to act as “organizing laboratories”, testing out new 
strategies and techniques for organizing low-wage workers.70 In Part VI.B.2, I will argue that 
applying the provisions and strictures of the current labor law scheme would limit the 
effectiveness of worker centers in engaging employers in ways that extend beyond the 
permissible limits under the law to combat the new challenges facing low-wage workers in the 
21st century economy.  
III. The Long and Short of American Labor Law: From the Wagner Act to the 
Landrum Griffin Act  
The current labor law regime, encapsulated by the National Labor Relations Act and its 
subsequent amendments, has not been substantially updated since 1959. As will be discussed in 
Part II of this paper, the labor laws as interpreted and applied have proven to be ineffectual in 
protecting the rights of workers to organize and act for mutual aid or protection in recent years. 
However, there is much to be gleaned from the history of these laws and the underlying policy 
decisions. The issues Congress found to be widespread and sought to address in passing the 
NLRA in 1935 are very much alive today. The stated goal of empowering workers by equalizing 
bargaining power between capital and labor offers support to the argument that worker centers 
should remain free from the restraints of an ill-suited labor regime in order to assist low wage 
workers who, like the blue-collar workforce of the 1930s, have been unable to enforce their 
rights against the power of capital.  
                                               
63 Id.  
64 Janice Fine, Alternative Labour Protections Movements in the United States: Reshaping Industrial Relations?, 
154 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW 15, 19 (2015).  
65 Id.  
66 Fine, supra note 21 at 615.  
67 Id. at 620.  
68 Id. at 606, 609. 
69 Id. at 606.  
70 Id.  
A. Wagner Act promises workers a place at the bargaining table 
Despite the productivity and prosperity that characterized post-WWI America, the blue-
collar working class did not equally share in this abundance71. Following a boom in consumer-
oriented industries and consumer products, many of America’s working class found themselves 
unable to partake in the consumption and began to struggle to support themselves and their 
families72. The position of American workers became even more desperate as America and the 
rest of the world entered the Great Depression after the stock market crash of 1929. A master 
orator, President Franklin Roosevelt articulated the needs of America’s workers as being a need 
for both freedom from want and from the oppression of industrial tyranny73.  In support for the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, an early attempt to address the labor unrest, President 
Roosevelt framed the purpose of government interference in labor relations as being “to restore 
our rich domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity.”74 A particular “American” 
standard of living was being posited as a right of citizenship, where freedom from want was to be 
as respected as the “classically liberal freedoms of religion and speech.”75 
Even prior to the start of the Great Depression, there was a view held by some radicals 
that a great contradiction existed between capitalism and democracy. Where outside of the realm 
of corporate America values of personal autonomy and democratic participation were lauded, 
these values were often punished and prohibited inside of private enterprises.76 President 
Roosevelt, aware of the need for a national movement for industrial democracy, stated that “‘[a] 
small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other 
people’s property, other people’s money, other people’s labor—other people’s lives. For too 
many of us life was no longer free; liberty was no longer real; men could no longer follow the 
pursuit of happiness.’”77 As such, it was the duty of modern government to insure that the rights 
of American citizenship, “due process, free speech, the right of assembly and petition”, were 
enforced in the workplace so that labor and capital were equals.78 
Incorporating protections set out in previous labor laws and addressing the loopholes that 
employers had exploited in previous acts, the Wagner Act of 1935, officially titled the National 
Labor Relations Act, identified the core collective action rights of workers and prohibited 
company-dominated unions as well as any other employer promulgated unfair labor practice 
designed to interfere with the exercise of workers’ rights under the act.79 Section 7 of the NLRA, 
inspired in large part by Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, insured workers 
the “right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”.80 The act’s restrictions and 
prohibitions were entirely aimed at employers, and it explicitly forbid employers to restrict, 
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coerce, or in any way interfere with employees’ exercise of their protected rights.81 The 
justification of the overtly pro-labor lean was that “only through government support could labor 
meet management on anything like equal terms in an industrialized society, and that the time had 
come when the scales, always so heavily weighted in favor of industry, should be redressed in 
favor of the workers.”82 
This policy was written directly into Section 1 of the NLRA. Summarizing Congress’ 
findings regarding the labor unrest common at the time, Section 1 states that industrial strife and 
the resulting disruption in the free flow of commerce was due in part to “[t]he inequality of 
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual 
liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership 
association”.83 Section 1 declares it to be the national policy to eliminate and monitor causes of 
industrial strife by protecting the exercise of employees’ rights to “self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”84 Congress’ value 
determinations and policy choices toward national labor relations in this moment in time were 
consistently articulated in statements made about the NLRA, in the NLRA itself, and in the 
monumental Supreme Court decision validating Congress’ authority and respecting its decision.  
Despite a tradition of hostility toward previous labor laws, the Supreme Court upheld the 
NLRA against a constitutional challenge in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.85 In 
writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes summarized the labor policy that Congress, as 
well as the Court, had come to adopt, a statement encompassing the formal position of the United 
States toward workers’ rights: 
“Thus, in its present application, the statute goes no further than to safeguard the 
right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own 
choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or 
coercion by their employer. That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear 
a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the 
respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and 
agents…Long ago, we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they 
were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was 
helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his 
daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer 
refused to pay him the wages he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave 
the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to 
give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.”86   
While the current labor scheme has been amended with a more favorable treatment of business 
interests,87 the underlying principles have remained the same. Congress codified the importance 
of striking a balance between the relative power of labor and capital. As Chief Justice Hughes 
commented, the situation before Congress in 1935 necessitated government intervention on 
behalf of workers who were deemed to be helpless and powerless absent the legal protections of 
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their right to organize and collectively act for mutual aid and support. As I will argue in Part 
VI.B, the current situation demands action to elevate workers to an equal bargaining position as 
employers. Abiding by the policy choices articulated in the passing of the NLRA, Congress, the 
Department of Labor, and the NLRB should recognize the weakened bargaining power of low-
wage workers and facilitate, or at least refuse to inhibit, the worker centers that have emerged to 
reassert the rights of workers vis a vis offending employers.   
B. Increase in anti-union sentiment leads to the Taft Hartley Act   
As industry commenced a reconversion of its facilities to adjust to peacetime production 
after WWII, workers found themselves being laid off in large numbers or taking home smaller 
wages.88 Determined not to lose the gains it had achieved during the war, organized labor 
engaged in a series of strikes, constituting what has been called the “1945-1946 Strike Wave”.89  
This wave of labor unrest intensified a pre-existing anti-union drive among those, particularly in 
the corporate community, who felt the Wagner Act had made the labor unions too powerful as it 
imposed no restrictions on labor.90 Through propaganda campaigns, business labeled unions as 
selfish special interest groups who operated against the public interest.91 As agitation for an 
amendment to the balance of power in the Wagner Act grew and organized labor remained 
steadfast in its opposition to any change to the act, the Taft Hartley Act, legislation “heavily 
slanted against labor organizations”, was passed in 1947 over President Truman’s veto.92  
The Taft Hartley Act, which became known later on as the Labor Management Relations 
Act of 194793, amended the Wagner Act to include protections for managerial rights and to 
“provide workers the same protections from labor organizations that the Wagner Act offered 
from employers.”94 For the purposes of this paper, the act’s restriction on secondary boycotts is 
the most relevant. Secondary boycotts have been described as “protests or pickets by a union 
against a business with which it does not have an actual or potential bargaining relationship”.95 
The restriction against secondary boycotts is relevant because this form of boycott or picket is a 
powerful tactic, exerting economic pressure on an employer by directing action against another 
entity that does business with the employer. As explained in Part II, worker centers have 
successfully utilized this strategy to bring economic pressure against an entity that lies further up 
the supply chain or that has created distance between itself and the workers in question through a 
subcontracting relationship. The prohibition on secondary boycotts under the Taft Hartley Act 
applies only to statutory labor organizations, meaning that worker centers could lose access to 
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this effective tactic if they are deemed to fall within the NLRA’s definition of “labor 
organization”.  
C. Landrum Griffin Act attempts to address public concerns of union corruption  
While the Taft Hartley Act placed some significant restraints on the activities of unions, 
it did not include any provisions regarding the internal governance of unions. As public concern 
was aroused by stories of union corruption, Congress turned its focus to the internal affairs of 
labor unions.96  In 1957, the Senate established a Select Commission on Improper Activities in 
the Labor or Management Field, which was to be led by Senator John McClellan.97 The 
McClellan Committee revealed a starker image than anticipated, with various accounts of 
election fraud, racketeering, embezzlement and misuse of union funds, collusion between union 
officials and employers, and overall “union dictatorship”.98 The testimony implicated only a 
handful of unions, including the mighty Teamsters Union as well as some smaller-scale unions; 
however, the allegations of corruption were sufficient to cloak all of organized labor in 
suspicion.99 After the committee submitted its report, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act, 
or the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959.100 The final act has 
been described as a compromise between reformers who sought an increase in internal union 
democracy and labor critics who saw this as an opportunity to weaken labor.101   
Title I of the LMRDA, a form of Bill of Rights for workers, outlines fundamental rights 
of workers vis a vis their union.102 Title II requires labor organizations to disclose financial 
information regarding the organization and its officials to organization members, and it dictates 
that labor organizations create and maintain a constitution and bylaws detailing the structural, 
governance, and financial mechanisms in place.103 Additionally, Title II requires labor 
organizations to submit this information, as well as other disclosure forms, to the Department of 
Labor’s Office of Labor Management Standards (OLMS).104 Title IV specifies the election 
requirements for organization officials, mandating that elections occur at specific times and by 
secret ballot.105 Title V creates a fiduciary duty on the part of organization officials to members 
with respect to the organization’s funds.106  
In addition to the detailed reporting and disclosure requirements, the LMRDA also served 
to further restrict the lawful actions of labor organizations. The prohibition against secondary 
boycotts was expanded to “prevent a union from bringing any pressure to bear on an employer to 
make him cease doing business with another employer.”107 Additionally, the act amended the 
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NLRA to include Section 8(b)(7) in the list of prohibited unfair labor practices. The new 
prohibition restricted picketing “for organizational or recognitional purposes by a union for more 
than 30 days if it has not filed a petition with the NLRB to represent the workers.”108 
Based on the literature written about the LMRDA with regards to worker centers, there 
are two issues to note at this juncture. First, the reporting requirements, intended to implement 
and safeguard internal democracy within labor organizations, seemed to have been based on an a 
“particular notion of institutional democracy” where “representative democracy is taken as a 
given.”109 Second, the LMRDA’s legislative history indicates that there was some concern that 
the stringent and intrusive regulations on the internal governance of private labor organizations 
raised freedom of association issues.110 However, the enactment of the LMRDA indicates that a 
majority thought the “interference was justified in response to the specific problems identified by 
the Committee”, i.e. corruption and lack of internal democracy.111 I will return to this idea of the 
perceived justification for infringing on a private organization’s freedom of association in Part 
VI.B.3, where I will pose the argument that the proffered justification for the intrusion on labor 
unions is not present in the context of worker centers.   
IV. The Decline in Workers’ Bargaining Power  
The recent literature on the decline in traditional labor unions and the rise of worker 
centers and other alt-labor groups have cited the courts, employers, and the changing socio-
economic landscape as the primary reasons for why labor law is currently failing to adequately 
protect the rights of workers, particularly low-wage immigrant workers, to organize and act in 
mutual aid or protection.112 While the NLRA has proven to be ineffective in both its stated 
protections and in its remedial scheme, the interpretations by the courts and subsequent 
amendments by Congress have served to grant employers greater protections over matters 
deemed to be managerial prerogatives. Consequently, the balance in bargaining power between 
labor and capital that Congress sought to reach through the Wagner Act has been upended with a 
thumb on the scales in favor of employers. Beyond the issues with the letter and spirit of the 
current labor law scheme, the changing social and economic dynamics since the time of the law’s 
passing have provided additional opportunities for employers to avoid unionization and have 
contributed to the creation of a new vulnerable class of workers.    
A. Weaknesses in the structure and interpretation of the NLRA as employers are able 
to evade the worker protections of the statute    
For a time after its initial enactment, the NLRA did accomplish what is set out to do, 
which was to elevate workers to an even playing field with employers by protecting their right to 
organize. However, some limitations inherent in the statute are worth noting. The statute does 
not cover all workers, leaving some large categories of workers unprotected. In defining the term 
“employees” as covered under the act, § 2(3) states 
“[B]ut shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in 
the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual 
employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an 
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independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any 
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as 
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as 
herein defined.” 
Additionally, the amendments to the act, the Taft Hartley Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 
further restrained the potential effectiveness of labor organizations in representing workers and 
enforcing their rights by prohibiting certain economic strategies and placing intrusive 
requirements on the formal governance and reporting of the entity. The Supreme Court has also 
weakened the protections of the NLRA in its interpretations of the act, some of which were later 
codified in the amendments to the NLRA, that “undercut the Act’s protection of the right to 
strike, made it easier for employers to oppose union campaigns, and generally shored up 
managerial rights of control over the workplace.”113 
 Employers have also found ways, both legal and illegal, to bypass the primary employee 
protections of the NLRA. With decisions by the Supreme Court that established the employer’s 
right to hire permanent replacements for striking workers and limited the scope of the mandatory 
subjects for collective bargaining, excluding “matters of entrepreneurial judgment”, employers 
have been able to avoid unionization by either subcontracting peripheral activities or by shutting 
down and relocating production.114 It has been argued that employers seeking to resist 
unionization are able to exploit the NLRA’s ineffective enforcement mechanisms, weak penalties 
for violations, and lengthy process delays.115  
The weak penalties built into the NLRA do not properly disincentivize employers from 
violating employees’ rights to act collectively for their mutual aid and protection.116  If 
successful in a claim alleging termination in retaliation for collective activity, workers are 
eligible for back pay but are not entitled to punitive damages.117 In these retaliation cases, 
employees have an obligation to mitigate the damage from lost wages by seeking new 
employment in the meantime, further reducing the financial penalty on violating employers.118 
For some workers, reinstatement may be an available remedy, but the proceedings have proven 
to be costly, drawn out, and ineffective.119 According to Professor Andrias of University of 
Michigan Law School, the median time between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge and 
the issuance of a final order from the NLRB approximates 500 days.120  Considering the low 
probability and low cost of getting caught, the potential gains for taking illegal actions to prevent 
unionization are compelling reasons to disregard the law. Previous studies suggested that 
employers were capitalizing on this opportunity to refuse unionization.121 The NLRA is also 
limited in its ability to implement its stated goal to protect and facilitate collective bargaining. As 
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the NLRA cannot impose its own terms if a party to negotiations fails to bargain in good faith 
under the act, the good faith bargaining requirement has very little bite.122  
B. An increasingly fissured economy brings changes in workforce structure and 
composition, as well as a precarious situation for low wage immigrant workers   
The dawn of the fissured economy123 and the rise of an increasingly contingent workforce 
have provided employers with additional opportunities to avoid the burden and cost of 
complying with the NLRA, and these law avoiding tactics, clearly in violation of the spirit of the 
labor laws, have not been deemed to be a technical violation of the law.  
Inherent in the NLRA is a particular model of employment centered on the relationship 
between an individual employer and its employees.124 The current labor law scheme was created 
during the New Deal-era and subsequently reflects the industrial economy of the time where blue 
collar workers, largely white males, enjoyed relatively secure fulltime employment with a single 
industrial employer and sought to bargain collectively with this employer as a way of expressing 
their collective voice.125 However, this model no longer accurately reflects the realities of the 21st 
century economy and workforce, reducing the ability of the labor law scheme to address the 
problems facing workers in the modern era.  
Starting in the 1970s, the American economy responded to increased domestic and 
international competition with a process that has been called “deindustrialization”.126 American 
businesses reshaped themselves in an effort to adapt to the new age of international competitors 
successfully capturing the market on higher value, low-priced products in the mass production 
industries.127 As capital began to move overseas, employment in manufacturing and industrial 
sectors contracted and employment in the service sectors, those largely unaffected by global 
competition, expanded.128 During this period, there was an increasing trend in economic 
fissuring whereby businesses focus on the core activities of the company and slough off all 
peripheral activities by entering subcontracting relationships with domestic or international 
companies.129 In subcontracting a particular project or an entire job, businesses “can take 
advantage of the downward pressure facing smaller companies that compete to win bids for those 
jobs.”130 Additionally, businesses began to move away from the idea of fulltime, permanent 
employment and toward a free agent conception of employment, limiting the number of full time 
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employees on the payroll and increasing their use of “contingent workers”.131 Through these 
changes in the structure of the workplace, employers have been able to shift the risk of increased 
competition to this new class of contingent, low-wage workers.132  
While employers restructured their businesses for both efficiency and financial reasons, a 
primary motivation behind the economic fissuring was to avoid unionization.133 The use of 
subcontractors or overseas production facilities for peripheral activities became another 
avoidance strategy for employers to ignore current collective bargaining agreements, while 
tactics like permanently replacing strikers or closing a plant and opening non-union plants in new 
locations benefitted employers opposed to the organization attempts of its workers.134 Despite 
the interference with employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively, these tactics were 
largely upheld by the courts, who seemed to place the managerial and property interests of 
employers above the collective action rights of employees.135  
Supply chains, subcontracting, franchising, and other nontraditional employment 
relationships make unionization near impossible.136 In the case of subcontracting, workers may 
be successful in organizing their direct employer but may overall prove fatal to the success of the 
supplier company in competing with other, non-unionized supplier companies for bids for 
contracts in “low-margin markets”.137 Similar obstacles to effective unionization exist in the 
franchisee-franchisor relationship, where employees may be able to effectively organize and 
bargain with the franchisee but still be helpless in the face of a franchisor that has significant 
control over the terms and conditions of employment and little incentive to negotiate. Downward 
pressure on wages in the franchising context creates incentives for franchisees to favor part-time, 
low wage positions as a way of avoiding the requirements under federal and state labor and 
                                               
131 Andrias, supra note 112 at 21-22 (defining contingent workers as including part-time workers, temporary 
employees, and independent contractors).  
132 Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2244 (explaining that by labeling a growing number of workers as temporary employees 
or as independent contractors, employers have been able to decentralize their production and increase their overall 
flexibility as well as shield themselves from the burden of complying with employment laws that only apply to 
statutory employees).  
133 Andrias, supra note 112 at 22. 
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 See Whitney, supra note 112 at 1466; See also LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 72 at 220 (in explaining the 
contemporary socio-economic context within which labor unions have proven largely unsuccessful in vindicating 
the rights of workers, the author writes:  
“[T]rade unions are good for industrial society because they raise wages, not only for union 
members themselves but for the entire working population. Unions seek to take wages out of 
competition for individual firms, industries, and whole regions of the nation. Moreover, the labor 
movement has operated in a political sphere to raise the entire social wage, if only as a means to 
better defend its own wage standards…. But now, such ideas seem counterproductive, divisive, 
and vaguely unpatriotic. High wages made American manufacturing uncompetitive, and union 
work rules and formal grievance procedures stifled creativity and generated inflexibility….In the 
United States the deregulation late in the 1970s of labor intensive, highly competitive industries 
like trucking, airlines, and telephone cast aside the New Deal worry that “cutthroat” business 
practices would generate wage debasement. And since increases in compensation among 
unionized workers far outpaced income growth in the non-union sector…American managers 
found themselves with a new incentive to put wages back into competitive play….”  
137 Id. (“[U]nionization of a single low-level supplier is not an effective strategy for workers looking to better their 
position.”).  
employment laws.138 And in all employment contexts, the increased mobility of capital has given 
legitimacy to the threat of plant closure as a response to attempts to organize a workplace.139 As 
discussed above, the weak enforcement mechanisms of the NLRA fail to disincentive employers 
from using this threat, further increasing the obstacles to unionization in mobile industries.   
The changing structure of the economy and, in turn, the workforce has limited the impact 
of the NLRA as employers are able to organize their businesses so to operate outside of the reach 
of the labor laws.140  Of particular relevance for many contingent workers, the NLRA, again 
based on the traditional employment model, does not “facilitate collective action across multiple 
employers.”141 Organizing drives under the NLRA rely on the majority support of an appropriate 
bargaining unit within a single business. Subsequently, it is possible that employees will be 
powerless to bargain or negotiate with business entities that have significant control over the 
terms and conditions of their employment but are not the employees’ direct employer.142 Finally, 
the NLRA places explicit restrictions on employees’ use of multi-employer action in prohibiting 
secondary boycotts. Employees cannot participate in or encourage action that places pressure on 
one business in order to put economic pressure on an employer, even if the secondary business 
and the employer are intertwined, with an exception for joint employers.143 While employers are 
free under the NLRA to organize their business in terms of the structure of its workforce and its 
working relationships with other employers to best suit their business goals, employees are 
restricted by the NLRA in terms of who can be organized and with whom they have a protected 
right to bargain over the terms and conditions of their employment.  
The changes summarized in this section, as well as recent changes to immigration 
patterns, have created a new working class in need of new organizing techniques. Labeled the 
“precariat”, this new class of workers consists of precarious workers, or those who lack 
employment security and are largely “excluded from the legal protections that the organized 
labor movement struggled to achieve.”144  An influx of unauthorized immigrant workers in the 
1980s and 1990s aided the rapid growth of the precariat.145 Both authorized and unauthorized 
immigrant workers are concentrated in low wage jobs in the service sector, due in part to the fact 
that immigrants are frequently relegated to the lower levels of the “employment ladder and 
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frequently obtain only contingent work.”146 Unauthorized immigrant workers experience an 
added layer of vulnerability because of a constant fear of being discovered by immigration 
authorities. This fear leads to exploitation by employers who are aware of these workers’ illegal 
status and can use this knowledge against workers to prevent them from seeking redress to wage 
theft, unsafe working conditions, and other labor and employment law violations.147 The new 
precariat, particularly immigrant workers, have been deprived of the labor rights deemed 
essential to democracy in the workplace, and therefore democracy in the larger society, and 
traditional labor unions have proven inadequate in their attempts to reinstate the balance between 
labor and capital in the contemporary social and economic context.  
V. Business’ response: worker centers as fronts for traditional labor unions 
A. Calling foul: Business groups demand NLRB and Department of Labor to review 
worker centers 
Literature and media stories about worker centers and their place within the current labor 
law scheme first began to appear in earnest between 2012 and 2014, with labor critics becoming 
more vocal with the rise of worker center protests and broader social movements like the Fight 
for $15.148 In 2013, two House Republicans sent a letter to the Department of Labor requesting 
that they investigate whether worker centers are covered under the LMRDA and are therefore 
required to comply with its mandates.149 A year later, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce published 
a report on the leading worker centers, warning employers of prolonged labor unrest from these 
rebranded labor unions.150 In its introduction to its report, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
described the worker center movement as a front for labor unions to increase their membership 
without complying with burdensome labor law requirements that traditional labor unions must 
abide by.151 During this time, Republican members in the House of Representatives and labor 
critics claimed that “worker centers, by not registering as unions are wrongfully skirting the 
organizing, disclosure, and strike regulations that govern full-fledged unions.”152 For many in the 
pro-business camp, the relationship between traditional unions and worker centers is such that 
many worker centers were founded by individuals from the traditional labor movement or are 
tied closely with labor unions through financial support.153 Business groups have argued that 
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worker centers should be held to the same reporting and disclosure requirements and activity 
prohibitions that labor unions are held to because worker centers perform the same activities as 
unions, particularly in putting economic pressure on employers to improve work conditions.154 
Perhaps the most substantive argument posed by labor critics as to why the requirements 
and restrictions under the NLRA and LMRDA should be applied to worker centers is that these 
requirements secure workers’ rights vis a vis their labor representatives and therefore provide 
significant protections and benefits to workers.155 The labor laws governing the internal 
governance of labor unions were intended to establish the accountability of these organizations 
to their members through the “promotion of the principles of organizational democracy, access to 
basic information and promotion of a duty of fair representation.”156 If worker centers are not 
considered labor organizations required to comply with the strictures of the labor laws, these 
organizations will avoid accountability to the workers that they represent. While worker centers 
may serve a useful function, “no organization, no matter how laudable its mission, is above 
reproach.”157 It is possible the corruption and fraud that tarnished the records of traditional labor 
unions could plague worker centers, and compliance with the labor laws should be required to 
prevent this possibility from becoming a reality.158 
Seeing hope for a pro-business decision from the Trump administration, pro-business 
groups have renewed their calls to the NLRB and the DOL to determine the status of worker 
centers in relation to the NLRA and the LMRDA. Labor critics have posed the same arguments 
they made in 2013 and 2014, primarily that worker centers are rebranded labor unions that have 
been permitted to act like unions while “dodging rules” put in place to curb some of these 
behaviors.159 Most of the energy of worker center critics has been spent in appealing to the 
Department of Labor to apply the LMRDA to worker centers and order them to file the same 
financial disclosure forms required of unions.160 In the minds of many business groups, “[i]f it 
looks like a union and acts like a union, it should be treated like a union.”161    
Business groups and supporting members of Congress may see their calls for scrutiny 
come true in the near future, which makes the labor organization question outlined below all the 
more relevant. In a hearing before the House Education and the Workforce Committee in 
November 2017, Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta, in response to a question from a committee 
member, said the department was looking into the legal status of worker centers.162 While there 
has been no update or further statements made by the Department of Labor on this matter, there 
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is cause for concern for worker centers.163 If applied to worker centers, the requirements and 
prohibitions of current labor laws would distort the worker center model and impair the 
effectiveness and success these centers have had to the extent that it is due to the flexible, 
unrestrained structure.164 Perhaps the greatest threat to worker centers is the risk of losing 
unrestrained access to the tactic of secondary boycotting. If § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA were applied 
to worker centers, these organizations would lose their ability, and one of their primary strategic 
advantages, to target supply chain retailers and other business entities that have real, yet indirect, 
influence on the terms and conditions of employment but are not directly engaged in a labor 
dispute with the worker center.      
VI. The “Labor Organization” Question: Should Worker Centers Be Treated as 
Statutory Labor Organizations under the NLRA and LMRDA?  
The debate between capital and labor takes both descriptive and normative forms: do 
worker centers fall within the scope of the NLRA and LMRDA and should they? Business 
groups agitate for greater scrutiny on worker centers and demand the determination that worker 
centers are labor organizations and must abide by the rules under the labor laws. Labor advocates 
claim that these centers do not fall under the statutory “labor organization” umbrella and find it 
would be inappropriate to apply labor laws developed in one historical context to organizations 
working in an entirely different context.  
I will argue that, based on previous Board interpretations of the statutory definition of 
labor organization, worker centers do not fall within the labor organization definition. In the 
event that worker centers begin to develop a pattern or practice of performing activities that push 
it over the threshold of a statutorily-defined labor organization, I argue that the labor laws should 
still not be applied to these centers. First, worker centers, through their structures and strategies 
currently unfettered by antiquated labor law provisions, champion labor policy and goals, 
adopted by Congress in 1935, in the modern era. Second, the concerns and intentions underlying 
the broad definition of “labor organization” under the NLRA and LMRDA have not been 
triggered by the activities of worker centers, negating any policy-based reason to extend the 
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definition to include worker centers. Lastly, the differences between labor unions and worker 
centers raises constitutional questions concerning the intrusion into the internal governance of 
private worker center associations. Both policy and constitutional-based arguments weigh in 
favor of refraining from applying the current labor law scheme to worker centers.        
A. Worker centers do not fall within the statutory definition of “labor organization” 
Despite the demands of business groups, it is inappropriate to have a brightline rule that 
worker centers qualify as labor organizations under the NLRA and LMRDA. As Board decisions 
interpreting the statutory definition indicate, the “labor organization” analysis is a fact-intensive 
analysis and depends on how the alleged labor organization interacts with the employer. With 
that, I would like to caveat the below analysis by noting that it would be useful to have an   
updated study of worker centers to see if the detailed survey in 2006 is still reflective of the 
current worker center model. Because the 2006 survey provided a wealth of information on the 
foundational features and common characteristics of worker centers, it is likely to be an accurate, 
relevant portrayal of worker centers. However, having a more recent, in-depth look at the 
specific activities the worker centers are engaging in would provide additional support to the 
statutory argument that worker centers are not labor organizations.   
1. Labor organization under the NLRA  
Although there may be some uncertainty in how the NLRB and Department of Labor, as 
well as the courts of appeal, will interpret and apply previous case law on the labor law question, 
the current situation as it stands today suggests that worker centers will not be considered labor 
organizations as defined by the statutes. “Labor organization” is defined in § 2(5) of the NLRA 
as being “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or 
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of 
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work.”165 Worker centers will likely satisfy the elements of “any 
organization”, employee participation, and concerning grievances, wages, and conditions of 
work.166 The labor organization question, therefore, will turn on whether worker centers “exist 
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers”.167  
While there have been seminal decisions interpreting the meaning of “dealing with” that 
form the bedrock of “dealing with” analysis, the § 2(5) “labor organization” doctrine is far from 
clear and consistent. In the literature on the labor organization question, academics differ in how 
they view the Board’s jurisprudence on this question, relying on different Board decisions to 
support their assessment of the Board’s construction of § 2(5). The fact of the matter is that the 
Board’s decisions have lacked consistency and clarity.168 Without having a coherent 
understanding of the Board’s historical interpretation of the statutory definition, it is difficult to 
predict how the Board will interpret it in the future. Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of case law constituting the § 2(5) jurisprudence has been in the context 
of company-unions. The legal status of worker centers has not been addressed head-on in any 
NLRB decision or court of appeals case. As such, it is unclear whether the Board will apply its § 
2(5) jurisprudence outside of the company-union context. 
                                               
165 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) 
166 See Rosenfeld, supra note 163 at 483-85. 
167 Id. at 485. 
168 See Whitney, supra note 112 at 1497. 
The NLRB’s § 2(5) jurisprudence is founded in the Supreme Court case N.L.R.B. v. 
Cabot Carbon.169 The case addressed the question of whether employee committees, established 
for the purpose of addressing issues of “mutual interest”170 through monthly meetings with plant 
management, were labor organizations under § 2(5).171 In holding that the lower court erred in 
finding that the employee committees were not labor organizations under §2(5) “simply because 
they did not ‘bargain with’ employers in the ‘usual concept of collective bargaining’”, the Court 
established a broad construction of the “dealing with” clause. Recounting the legislative history 
of § 2(5), the Court stated that Congress’ conscious choice to include the language “dealing 
with” and not “bargaining collectively” indicates that “dealing with” should not be considered to 
be synonymous with “bargaining collectively”.172 In addition to enunciating the principle that 
organizations may be considered statutory labor organizations in the absence of traditional 
collective bargaining, Cabot Carbon also shed some light on how the language of § 2(5) should 
be understood and applied. Without specifically articulating the exact analysis to be undertaken, 
it is clear the Court examined both the stated purpose of the committees as well as the functions 
of the committees in order to determine that the employee committees existed “ for the purpose, 
in part at least, ‘of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of 
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.’”173 Therefore, the “dealing with” element of a 
§ 2(5) labor organization requires an analysis of both the explicit, stated purpose of the 
organization and the implicit purpose of the organization as inferred from the actions of the 
organization.  
The Board articulated its understanding and interpretation of the “dealing with” language 
in § 2(5) in its 1992 decision Electromation, Inc.174 Similar to Cabot Carbon, Electromation was 
decided in the context of an employer-dominated employee committee, also known as a 
company union. In order to determine whether the employer had violated § 8(a)(2) by 
dominating or interfering with the “action committees” in question, the Board needed to first 
determine whether these committees fell within the statutory definition of “labor organization” 
under § 2(5).175 The Board found that the employer established several action committees, 
consisting of volunteer employees and members of management, to meet weekly to discuss 
issues such as wages, attendance programs, and leave policy.176 Like the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Cabot Carbon, the Board answered the question of whether the action committees 
existed for the purpose of dealing with the employer by looking at the express purpose of the 
committees as well as the implicit purpose based on what the committees actually did.177 Under 
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this analysis framework, the Board determined that the action committees were created to 
“achieve a bilateral solution” to the issues workers complained of, and did indeed create a 
bilateral process by which employees and management worked toward “bilateral solutions on the 
basis of employee-initiated proposals.”178 This bilateral process to achieve bilateral solutions “is 
the essence of ‘dealing with’ within the meaning of § 2(5).”179 
The Board further expounded upon its bilateral mechanism refinement in E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co.180 As in both Cabot Carbon and Electromation, this case was based on a 
challenge against internal committees composed of both employees and management members 
that alleged the committees constituted an employer-dominated labor organization.181 The Board 
explained that the term “dealing” indicates a bilateral mechanism, but does not require a 
compromise between the two parties.182 Instead, this “‘bilateral mechanism’ ordinarily entails a 
pattern or practice in which a group of employees, over time, makes proposals to management, 
management responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed….”183 The 
“dealing with” prong of the § 2(5) analysis, therefore, is met if the evidence shows that either 
such a pattern or practice existed or that the organization was created for the purpose of engaging 
in such a pattern or practice.184 However, the Board indicated that “if there are only isolated 
instances in which the group makes ad hoc proposals to management followed by a management 
response of acceptance or rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing.”185 
Because the committees in question entailed employees discussing and submitting proposals on 
statutory subjects to management committee members who could reject them if they chose, the 
Board found the “dealing with” requirement met.186 
Later board decisions confirmed the “dealing with” prong requires a pattern or practice of 
interactions between workers and an employer and not isolated incidents between the parties.187 
However, the Board’s Electromation progeny has raised many questions that remain 
unanswered. For one, Cabot Carbon’s holding that “dealing with” is not synonymous with 
collective bargaining begs the question: “if ‘dealing with’ is less than bargaining, what is it more 
than?”188 The Board has not yet established the lower limits of the “dealing with” definition, 
meaning the Board could ultimately decides it includes activities that worker centers commonly 
engage in.189 Secondly, some academics have sensed a tension between the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cabot Carbon and the NLRB’s later decisions. Professor Michael Duff questions the 
distinction between E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.’s “pattern or practice” refinement and 
collective bargaining, asking why it is the case that “a statutory labor organization may be found 
without ‘bargaining’, but that a ‘pattern and practice of exchanging proposals over time’ implies 
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that a group is a labor organization?”190 With this confusion and the NLRB’s failure to clarify it, 
Professor Duff comments that “it is often risky to rely on the NLRB’s statutory interpretations 
given the reality of hostile appellate review,” further emphasizing the uncertainty surrounding 
the § 2(5) analysis and how it might be applied to worker centers.191 
However, all is not lost in this confusion. There has been one occasion to date in which 
the activities of a worker center were analyzed under the “labor organization” jurisprudence, and 
the outcome was favorable to worker centers. In 2006, the General Counsel of the NLRB issued 
an Advice Memorandum at the behest of a Regional Director stating his findings on whether the 
ROC was a labor organization under § 2(5) and therefore could be found in violation of the 
NLRA’s restrictions against recognitional picketing under § 8(b)(7)(C).192 The memo addresses 
complaints filed against the worker center Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-
NY) in response to demonstrations ROC-NY led against a few upscale chefs and the subsequent 
settlement agreements that were reached. In one case, the ROC-NY protested outside of chef 
Daniel Boulud’s restaurant Daniel in response to the chef’s discrimination against Haitian and 
Bangladeshi employees applying to become waiters.193 ROC-NY engaged in similar 
demonstrations against chef Mario Batali’s restaurant Del Posto over misappropriated tips and 
unpaid overtime, reaching a $1.5 settlement agreement that “included new polices on promotions 
and paid sick days.”194  
The General Counsel found that, although the ROC-NY’s lawsuit settlement negotiations 
with the restaurants “could arguably be considered ‘dealing’ within an expansive interpretation 
of Section 2(5)”, the evidence did not show that ROC-NY’s conduct constituted “a pattern or 
practice of dealing over time.”195 In support of its decision, the General Counsel analyzed the 
ROC-NY’s lawsuit settlement negotiations through the Electromation progeny, finding that the 
lawsuit settlement negotiations and subsequent agreements were discrete, non-reoccurring 
interactions with the employers that were limited to “settling legal claims raised by 
employees.”196 Despite the fact the negotiations spread across a span of time, the General 
Counsel considered this to be dealings that were “limited to a single context or single issue” and 
that nothing in the agreements implied “an ongoing or reoccurring pattern of dealing with 
employment terms and conditions, beyond the resolution of the current dispute.”197 Absent a 
showing of pattern or practice of dealing over time, the General Counsel held that ROC-NY was 
not a labor organization under § 2(5).198  While some academics take issue with the analysis 
undertaken by the General Counsel199, this decision provides a potential framework under which 
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worker centers could be analyzed by the NLRB in the future. Based on both the text of the 
statute and the holding of the ROC memo, some academics have argued that worker centers 
would not fall under the statutory definition of labor organization200.  
Although an updated survey of worker centers would be useful, the information currently 
available suggests that the explicit purpose of worker centers as well as the activities undertaken 
by the centers would not qualify as a pattern or practice of dealing with an employer, or the 
purpose of engaging in such a pattern or practice. While worker centers engage in economic 
action organizing that seeks to place economic pressure on employers, these direct action 
campaigns are traditionally a tactic that supplements a lawsuit or other legal claim filed against 
the employer and serves as a method to encourage employers to enter settlement agreements. 
Worker centers do not have an ongoing role at any particular work place, and they will likely not 
engage with a particular employer a second time unless there is a violation of any settlement 
agreement or court order. Based on the analysis in the ROC Memo, this form of direct economic 
action campaign and settlement agreement negotiations do not constitute “dealing with” under 
the NLRA.       
Moreover, worker centers do not exist for the purpose of dealing with individual 
employers in the sense envisioned by the act. The historical goal of worker centers is to give a 
collective voice to marginalized, vulnerable workers in a variety of industries. Centers seek to 
place the concerns of these workers on the national agenda by advocating for better enforcement 
of current labor and employment law protections and for more protective regulation and 
legislation. In their efforts to increase public awareness and spur public and political action, 
centers engage in social policy organizing, which may involve demonstrations, protests, and 
boycotts of individual employers or multiple employers within an industry. These activities seek 
to engage the public and government officials, and not just employers. Actions that engage 
employers are necessary to the main objective of worker centers: elevate the social, political, 
economic interests of low-wage workers so as to be an equal player at the bargaining table. 
2. Labor organization under the LMRDA 
The “labor organization” analysis under the LMRDA is almost identical to the analysis 
under § 2(5) of the Wagner Act, although there is some debate about whether the definition of 
labor organization under the LMRDA expands the scope of the NLRA or limits it. Despite this 
uncertainty, there is a strong argument to be made that worker centers do not fall within the 
statutory definition of labor organization under the LMRDA. § 3(i) of the LMRDA defines a 
labor organization as “a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce and 
includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, 
group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the 
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, 
general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a 
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national or international labor organization, other than a State or local central body.”201 Besides 
the added language about the type of organization included under the statute and the types of 
subjects that are dealt with, this definition contains the same elements as the definition under the 
Wagner Act: some form of organization, employee participation, the purpose of dealing with 
employers, and dealing with statutory subjects.   
However, § 3(i) is followed by § 3(j) which defines when a labor organization will be 
deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce.202 There is a debate between some 
academics as to the relationship between these two sections. Some argue that § 3(j) limits the 
scope of § 3(i) in that in order to be a § 3(i) labor organization, an entity must fall within one of 
the five categories of § 3(j)203. Others argue that § 3(j) should not be read to limit § 3(i) but 
rather to add clarity to what it could mean for an organization to be engaged in an industry that 
affects commerce.204 Labor advocate Eli Naduris-Weissman notes that while there is no 
definitive guidance on the appropriate reading of these two sections, regulations from the 
Department of Labor may help to shed some light. Although the regulations specify that the term 
“labor organization” will be interpreted broadly, the regulations “also suggest that a ‘labor 
organization’ must meet the general definition of section 3(i) as well as one of the categories of 
section 3(j) to be subject to the LMRDA requirements.”205  
Despite this uncertainty in the proper reading of the statute, the labor organization 
analysis is still likely to hinge on the “dealing with” interpretation. If § 3(i) and § 3(j) are read 
together, it could be argued either way whether worker centers fall within the five categories of 
organizations under § 3(j).206 If worker centers do fall within one of these five categories, the 
                                               
201 29 U.S.C. § 402(i).  
202 29 U.S.C. § 402(j) (“A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce if it: 
1. Is the certified representative of employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as 
amended, or the Railway Labor Act, as amended; or 
2. Although not certified, is a national or international labor organization or a local labor organization 
recognized or acting as the representative of employees of an employer or employers engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce; or 
3. Has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary body which is representing or actively seeking to 
represent employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2); or 
4. Has been chartered by a labor organization representing or actively seeking to represent employees within 
the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local or subordinate body through which such employees may 
enjoy membership or become affiliated with such labor organization; or 
5. Is a conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council, subordinate to a national or 
international labor organization, which includes a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce within the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection, other than a State or 
local central body.” 
203 See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 187 at 288 (“[T]he two sections must be read together, with section 3(j) 
specifying the particular types of labor organizations that fall within the Act’s coverage so long as the general 
definition is also met.”).  
204 See Marculewicz & Thomas, supra note 93 at 85 (arguing that § 3(j) provides examples of organizations that fall 
within § 3(i) and that Congress generally intended “labor organizations” to be defined broadly under the LMRDA to 
capture any organization that engages in any extent in the representation of employees).   
205 Naduris-Weissman, supra note 187 at 288-89 (citing to 29 C.F.R. § 451.4(a) and to the congressional intent to 
target labor union affairs in enacting LMRDA).  
206 Eli Naduris-Weissman argues that worker centers would not fall into any of the five categories, considering the 
second category to be the only realistic possibility and briefly dismissing this possibility. Id. at 290. Naduris-
Weissman equated the phrase “recognized or acting as the representative of employees” with representing 
employees in collective bargaining, but did not elaborate on why acting as a representative necessarily means 
representing employees in collective bargaining.   
question of labor organization status will turn on whether the center exists for the purpose of 
“dealing with” under § 3(i), which is analyzed under the § 2(5) labor organization 
jurisprudence.207  
Similar to the NLRB General Counsel’s Memo regarding whether ROC-NY fell within 
the scope of § 2(5), the Department of Labor, the agency that oversees enforcement of the 
LMRDA, engaged in the labor organization analysis under § 3(i) of the LMRDA in responding 
to a request from Republican congressmen for a Department inquiry into the status of worker 
centers. In 2013, Representatives Kline and Roe sent a letter addressed to Secretary Perez 
requesting an official determination on whether worker centers, naming six centers in particular, 
are labor organizations under the LMRDA and are therefore required to comply with the 
reporting and disclosure provisions of the act.208 In response, the Department of Labor sent a 
letter to Chairman Kline outlining the Department’s historical framework for analyzing labor 
organization status under § 3(i) and its previous determinations as to whether ROC falls within 
the statutory definition of labor organization.209 
In his response letter, the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor explained that 
in making labor organization determinations for purposes of LMRDA enforcement, the 
Department applies the statutory test under § 3(i), which requires a showing that the entity is (1) 
an organization engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce, (2) involves the 
participation of employees, and (3) exists in whole or part for the purpose of dealing with 
employers on terms and conditions of employment.210 While the letter declined to specifically 
address the request for information on the six worker centers, the letter reminded the Chairman 
that the Department has “twice concluded—in 2004 and 2008—the ROC is not a labor 
organization under the LMRDA.”211 The Assistant Secretary explained that the evidence 
presented did not show that ROC was the exclusive representative of the employees, had 
engaged in collective bargaining, negotiated terms and conditions with the employers, or had the 
purpose of doing any of the above. Further, the evidence failed to show any “interchange of any 
kind between ROC and employers and, therefore, no dealing or intent to deal existed between 
ROC and employers.”212 The letter specifically stated that the Department, in these two 
decisions, noted that “the routine activities of legal service providers and activities targeting 
employers such as picketing, handbilling, and protesting, did not constitute dealing.”213 Without 
providing any explanation, the letter also indicated that the Department concluded that “ROC 
was not engaged in an industry affecting commerce under section 3(j) of the Act.”214 
As analysis under the LMRDA definition of labor organization is likely to closely mirror 
the analysis under § 2(5), the same arguments can be made in support of the position that worker 
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centers do not fall within the statutory definition of labor organization and therefore should not 
be subjected to the requirements and restrictions of the LMRDA. If the NLRB and Department 
of Labor remain consistent with their past decisions and advice statements, then the normal range 
of worker center activities will not be considered “dealing with” because they will not pass the 
pattern or practice standard. If worker centers engage employers at all, it is likely to be similar to 
the activities ROC-NY engaged in, which included action through legal processes and 
simultaneous demonstrations and pickets. As these activities were seen as isolated activities 
pertaining to a single issue or context by both the NLRB and the Department of Labor, there is a 
strong argument to be made in support of future similar worker center activity based on this 
precedent.  
B. Policy and constitutional arguments against applying current labor law 
restrictions to worker centers  
In addition to this textual argument as to why worker centers are not bound by the NLRA 
and LMRDA’s provisions regarding labor organizations, academics have made poignant policy-
based and constitutional arguments as to why these provisions should not be applied to worker 
centers. As worker centers seek to represent, organize, and advocate on behalf of workers across 
employers based on shared industry, geography, ethnicity, or immigrant status, centers appear to 
be “more like social movement organizations than traditional labor unions” at times.215 Many of 
the concerns that spurred the passage of the Wagner Act and the LMRDA are not present in the 
worker center context and make application of the stringent restrictions and requirements 
inappropriate. Making it their mission to fight for social and economic justice, worker centers 
have provided a collective voice for workers marginalized in both the workforce and in general 
society. Therefore, the collective action of worker centers resembles protected political speech, 
raising constitutional concerns with any attempt to restrict or interfere with it.  
1. Concerns inherent in labor prohibitions absent in worker center context  
Based on his findings from his study, Eli Naduris-Weissman suggested that the NLRB 
“has exercised discretion when applying the term ‘labor organization’ guided by the policy 
concerns underlying the NLRA provision being adjudicated.”216 Reviewing several Board 
decisions in which § 2(5) was interpreted and applied, Eli Naduris-Weissman found that  
“[T]he Board often uses the labor organization definition to further the Act’s 
purposes. Informal employee groups will be considered “labor organizations” in 
some cases where such a finding is necessary to punish employer activity that 
trenches on section 7 rights. However, where a finding of “labor organization” 
would subject the informal group to liability…the definition of labor organization 
loosens in order to protect concerted activity by employees.”217  
If the Board is moved to exercise its discretion when the policy implications call for it, then it 
should recognize the misfit of the policy underlying the current labor law provisions and the 
reality of the worker center movement.  
In enacting the Wagner Act, Congress sought to eliminate employer-dominated unions, 
and this goal influenced the scope and language of the statute.218 The legislative history of the 
Wagner Act indicates that labor organization was defined broadly in order to “encompass all 
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forms of existing company unions within section 8(a)(2)’s company union prohibition”.219 The 
questions raised by worker centers does not involve employer-dominated unions or any other 
violation of § 8(a)(2). As the broad scope of the “labor organization” definition was intended for 
the purpose of preventing employer interference in workers’ exercise of their § 7 rights, it is 
inappropriate to use this breadth to sweep up worker centers within the scope of the statute.  
Similarly, the LMRDA was drafted and enacted after the McClellan Committee made its 
report of fraud, embezzlement, and other forms of corruption within the labor union 
organizations. The provisions of the act sought to deter the misuse of organizational funds as 
well as other abuses by increasing internal transparency and regulating the internal governance to 
promote democratically-run organizations.220  However, there is no history, nor any allegation of, 
worker center corruption, abuse, fraud, or violence.221 Most worker centers have modest 
resources and rely primarily on charitable donations instead of membership dues for support, 
limiting the opportunity of corrupt individuals to misuse organization funds. Additionally, most 
worker centers are dedicated to promoting internal democracy as a “matter of philosophic 
commitment.”222 In fact, worker centers have made leadership development and training a large 
part of the services they offer workers in the hopes that workers themselves will play a role in the 
decision making and leadership of the center.223 
While the social policy of preventing labor organization corruption may become more 
relevant in the worker center context as these organizations grow in power and size, there are 
other external checks in place that make a blanket application of the stringent labor law reporting 
and disclosure requirements unnecessary. In receiving financial support from charitable 
foundations, it is likely worker centers will be required to comply with reporting requirements 
and be subjected to some level of oversight by the charitable organization, which serves as a 
check on worker center activity. Worker centers that have received tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status 
will need to comply with the IRS’ financial reporting requirements.224 Moreover, membership in 
a worker center is entirely voluntary, and worker centers do not assert themselves as the 
exclusive representatives of all employees in any particular worksite.225 The reasons for 
justifying the intrusions the NLRA and LMRDA imposed on private labor unions are not present 
here.226   
2. Worker centers champion New Deal labor policies in the 21st century 
The NLRA was enacted during a time of crisis. Workers were helpless against the power 
of capital, and struggled to share in the abundance created by their toil. Through the Wagner Act, 
Congress sought to empower the workers and to establish a balance between the relative 
bargaining power of labor and capital. Congress postulated that if business had the right to 
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organize and unionize as it wished, so too should labor. If the 1935 labor law is still in place, so 
are these initial goals and findings. The ever-increasing domestic and global competition, 
incentivizing employers to cut costs and structure their businesses in a way that will increase its 
competitive edge, has created a contemporary labor crisis. Workers have been isolated from one 
another through contingent work status and subcontracting work structures. Employers have 
been permitted to fissure their businesses, shedding off peripheral activities and subcontracting 
out some of its work, as well as to structure their employment relationships in a way that reduces 
the cost of labor. However, unions have been prevented under the labor law’s restrictions on 
boycotting and picketing from acting collectively against multiple employers or against 
manufacturers or retailers to effectively pressure the enterprise with real power over workers.  
Workers, particularly low-wage, immigrant workers, have been stripped of their 
collective voice and their rights to collective action. When employers violate workers’ § 7 rights, 
the remedies available under the NLRA fail to make workers whole or secure in their rights. 
Worker centers, through their flexibility in strategy, ability to target employers beyond 
employees’ direct employer, and public policy campaigns directed at entire industries and 
sectors, have been able to re-establish some semblance of a balance between the relative power 
of labor and capital. In a statement explaining its support of worker centers, the Ford Foundation 
stated, “Growing numbers of workers are finding themselves in low wage jobs with limited 
resources to support a family and move up the economic ladder. The foundation’s support for 
worker centers is one part of our effort to help more hard-working people climb out of poverty 
and achieve economic security.”227 Worker centers have helped to put the interests and concerns 
of low wage workers back on the national agenda. By organizing national campaigns that 
involve picketing and boycotting retailers, manufacturers, retailers, and franchisors who have the 
ability to improve the conditions of low wage workers at the end of the supply chain, worker 
centers have adapted traditional labor tactics to apply economic pressure on capital in the new 
fissured economy. Through both its direct economic action organizing and “social 
bargaining”228, worker centers have “the potential to salvage and secure one of labor law’s most 
fundamental commitments: to help achieve greater economic and political equality in society.”229   
Applying the restrictions under the NLRA against secondary boycotts would greatly 
weaken worker centers’ ability to reach business entities lacking direct employer status but 
having indirect control over the terms and conditions of employment for low-wage, immigrant 
workers. The limitations and requirements under the NLRA and the LMRDA would fetter the 
flexibility with which worker centers have been able to develop new solutions to new 
organization challenges. As worker centers have used this flexible organizing and unencumbered 
tactical decision-making to represent workers and industries initially deemed too difficult to 
organize, applying the current labor law scheme to worker centers would leave low-wage, 
largely immigrant workers without a voice at the bargaining table between labor and capital, in 
contravention to the stated national labor policy.  
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3. Application of NLRA and LMRDA restrictions would unjustifiably 
violate worker center’s constitutional rights  
As mentioned in Part VI.B.1, the historical justifications for labor law’s incursions into 
the associational rights of private organizations are not present in the worker center context, 
raising constitutional concerns regarding the prospect of applying intrusive reporting 
requirements and restrictions on peaceful activities against worker centers. In his study, Eli 
Naduris-Weissman explains the tension between labor law restrictions and First Amendment 
associational rights: 
“The goal of the NLRA was to establish a well-defined system of industrial 
relations through which employee organizations and employers could manage 
conflict. Organizations like worker centers, which do not seek to represent 
employees over day-to-day workplace conflicts, do not fit well within this system. 
Rather, many worker centers can better be classified as civil rights and social 
movement groups who engage in the type of speech and litigation activity that has 
been accorded the highest degree of First Amendment protection.”230  
Worker centers engage in speech and action that is both politically and economically motivated, 
which requires greater caution from government agencies in applying burdensome restrictions 
than in the traditional labor union context. 
Inherent in the above quote is the idea that the current labor scheme was based on a 
compromise between capital and labor that was struck in 1935.231 “[T]raditional labor took part 
in a conscious bargain in which it gave up certain associational rights and flexibility in exchange 
for government support and protection.”232 Labor unions accepted the restrictions on the 
organizing activities and, later, requirements for how they were to govern their organization in 
order to have their position as the exclusive bargaining representative within a particular 
workplace protected and enforced; worker centers have never sought these protections, nor have 
they petitioned to be the exclusive representative of any group of employees before their 
employer.233 Worker centers are entirely voluntary organizations, and there is “no constitutional 
justification for failing to provide worker centers with the full freedoms of assembly and 
association other voluntary associations receive.”234 Without receiving the protections under the 
NLRA and securing the right to be the exclusive representative of any particular workplace, 
worker centers should not be required to sustain the intrusion on their freedoms posed by the 
NLRA’s restrictions on boycotting and picketing and the LMRDA’s provisions regulating the 
internal governance and reporting. Applying the restrictions of the current labor law regime 
would not only be inappropriate in terms of the policy underpinnings of the labor laws but also 
constitutionally problematic.   
In a 2015 guest post for the blog OnLabor, Cynthia Estlund, professor of employment 
and labor law at NYU Law School, discussed the balance of powers and restrictions placed on 
traditional labor unions under the labor law regime as well as the constitutional implications of 
the absence of these particular rights in the worker center context.235 Estlund describes the 
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bargain struck between capital and labor under the Wagner Act as labor law’s “quid pro quo” by 
which the laws “both constrain and empower unions beyond what is normal and permissible for 
voluntary associations.”236 Intrusive restrictions on labor union activity and self-governance can 
find justification in the special legal rights and powers that labor law bestows on them.237 Estlund 
describes these powers as including the right to vie to be the exclusive representative of 
employees, both group members and non-members, based on majority vote; to compel individual 
employers to bargain in good faith; and to bargain for the right to collect dues from non-
members.238 However, worker centers do not possess or even seek to gain these rights. Worker 
centers do not hold themselves out as the exclusive representative of employees in their 
interactions with individual employers. Without possessing any of these powers, worker centers 
are simply voluntary associations engaged in peaceful economic and policy organizing, 
advocacy, and service to its members.239 “Without any distinctive legal powers, there is simply 
no constitutional justification for denying to worker centers the full freedom of expression, 
assembly, and association, and the freedom from intrusive regulation of their internal affairs, 
which other voluntary associations enjoy.”240 
The cannon of constitutional avoidance advises that courts refrain from interpreting a 
statute “that raises serious constitutional questions.”241 The cannon has been applied in the 
context of the NLRA, in which the Supreme Court held that “[W]here an otherwise acceptable 
construction of [the Act] would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”242 In the context of worker centers, the cannon would caution the NLRB and the 
Department of Labor against finding worker centers to be labor organizations under the NLRA 
and the LMRDA. Finding worker centers to be labor organizations based on the lawsuit-based 
direct action they engage in against particular employers would have a chilling effect on the right 
of workers to petition the court for redress, a constitutional right deemed to be of the utmost 
importance. Limitations on the direct action strategies employed by worker centers would be a 
limitation on the rights of low-wage, immigrant workers to engage in collective activity for 
mutual aid and protection. Restrictions on the rights of low-wage, immigrant workers to act 
collectively through worker centers to publicize the economic, political, and social inequalities 
they face would be an unwarranted and unconstitutional expansion of the labor law scheme, an 
expansion unintended by Congress in drafting the legislation in 1935.     
VII. Conclusion      
 Concerned about the increasing rate of industrial strife, Congress drafted, debated, and 
adopted the Wagner Act, and subsequent amendments, to create and maintain a balance in 
economic power between capital and labor. The compromise struck between the parties called 
for labor unions to agree to State interference in the tactics employed and their internal 
governance in return for the protected and exclusive right to organize and represent workers in 
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collective bargaining. Concerns about company unions, potential harm to neutral employers, 
union corruption, and undemocratic practices within labor organizations influenced the 
development of the labor law scheme and are integral in understanding the congressional intent 
behind the NLRA and LMRDA. Viewed in this context, the labor laws are inapposite to the 
situation that worker centers find themselves in. Worker centers have neither requested nor 
received protected status as the exclusive collective bargaining representatives of individual 
worksites, and they therefore should not be forced to suffer through State incursions into their 
private right of assembly. In the absence of complaints of company unions, corruption, and 
undemocratic practices, the broad definitions and sweeping statutory provisions developed in 
response to these concerns in labor unions should not be used against worker centers. Business 
groups posit worker centers as fronts for labor unions to avoid compliance with the law, but this 
characterization fails to fully capture the history, purpose, and functions of worker centers in this 
fissured economy. As worker centers may toe the line in terms of their “dealings with” 
employers, the sociopolitical context and policy underpinnings of the current labor law regime 
gravitate toward a finding of non “labor organization” status.    
   
